

## *Mission Impossible? Building A Socialist/Nationalist Party in Quebec*

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Roch Denis, *Luttes de classes et question nationale au Québec 1948-1968* (Montréal: Presses socialistes internationales 1979).

Pierre Fournier, *The Québec Establishment. The Ruling Class and the State* (Montréal: Black Rose Books, 2nd Revised Edition 1976).

Pauline Vaillancourt, guest editor, *QUÉBEC and the Parti Québécois* (San Francisco: A Synthesis Publication 1979).

RECENTLY, THE EDITOR of *Saturday Night* commented that one of the most striking features of recent intellectual life in Canada was the proliferation of Marxist and neo-Marxist academics and literature. Nowhere has the phenomenon become more generalized and entrenched than in Quebec where Marxist ideology in all its forms and varieties permeates the labour movement, the co-operative movement, and secondary and post-secondary education. As a consequence the intellectual discourse in the electronic and print media over the past 15 years has been extremely lively and, upon occasion, quite revealing about the socio-economic and political turmoil sweeping through Quebec society. Little of this material has, until recently, been made available to the English language reader and this is one of the basic advantages of the books being reviewed below.

*The Québec Establishment* by Pierre Fournier was completed at a most opportune moment and was widely acclaimed by reviewers in all parts of the country. Many of them saw in Fournier's study readymade answers to their nervous questions about the demise of Robert Bourassa's Liberal party and the rise to power of René Lévesque's *Parti Québécois*. A careful second reading will, no doubt, bring many of these reviewers to question the long-term implications of the seemingly insurmountable hegemony of the corporate sector in our liberal democratic social welfare state societies. Fournier's conclusions are not reassuring but deeply pessimistic.

Pierre Fournier's perspective is that of a Marxist-inspired political scientist who believes that "the functions of the state are primarily determined by the structures of capitalist society rather than by the individuals who occupy positions of state power." (201) Consequently, for Fournier the source of the political power of the capitalist class "is not greedy business leaders or corrupt politicians but results rather from their dominant ownership and control of the means of production, and the ideological hegemony which they exercise over

Michael Behiels, "Mission Impossible? Building A Socialist/Nationalist Party in Quebec," *Labour/Le Travailleur*, 7 (Spring 1981), 156-164.

the entire society." (201) While the state does function in the interests of the capitalist system it is, nonetheless, relatively autonomous and does, at times, introduce policies and programs which are neither initiated nor supported by the business sector. What Fournier does demonstrate convincingly in this study is the inordinately comprehensive influence and power wielded by the Quebec business elites, French and English, over the state even after the not so "Quiet Revolution" and its associated socio-economic and political reforms.

Fournier's approach is two-fold. Following in the footsteps of Porter's *The Vertical Mosaic*, Mill's *The Power Elite*, and Miliband's *The State in Capitalist Society*, part I of Fournier's study focuses on the institutional and ideological factors which account for business's influence and power in Quebec. Part II of the study is devoted to demonstrating how Quebec's business community uses its power by concentrating on three important issue-areas: education and language, labour and social matters, and economic development. Fournier's primary source was a lengthy questionnaire sent to senior level management of 100 Quebec major corporations and financial institutions. He supplemented this data with a number of interviews, several business publications, and the four daily Montreal newspapers.

In the section on the components of business power Fournier's study simply confirms most of what is already current wisdom about the nature of business and the corporate élite in modern Quebec. Using a *Parti Québécois* study Fournier contends that 62 corporations control over 50 per cent of Quebec's industrial production and within each industrial sector a few corporations dominate production and distribution. Fournier offers no reliable data on the precise extent and influence of Quebec's financial institutions apart from the very vague and general comments of Peter Newman on the high level of concentration in the Canadian banking system.

Again there are no major surprises offered in the chapter on the ideology of business élites. Nearly 85 per cent of respondents maintained that the main economic function of government was to create the economic conditions for the growth of the private sector. When asked what was the most important problem facing business in Quebec, 24 per cent replied Quebec's weak economic structure, 33 per cent answered unemployment and inflation and 30 per cent pointed to social unrest and labour problems. There were only minor variations between French- and English-speaking respondents, leading one to believe that money, shared ideology, and socio-economic class can do much to undermine ethnic conflict. While Quebec's Francophone and Anglophone corporations have developed separate lobbying forces — Board of Trade, Chambre de Commerce, Canadian Manufacturers' Association (Quebec) and the Centre des Dirigeants d'Entreprise — their message for and requests from the government are strikingly similar. The whole structure is crowned by the Conseil du Patronat du Québec with 130 member associations representing the employers of more than 80 per cent of Quebec's manpower. The Conseil's leadership is predominantly Francophone while the financial backing is mainly from the large English-Canadian corporations. Those in the *Parti Québécois* who count on the support of the disadvantaged Francophone business community for their sovereignty-association/social-democratic master plan had better take heed of Fournier's findings.

If the traditional pattern of business access to government prevailed after 15 November 1976 then the PQ government has no doubt heard the business point of view on all matters related to its interests. Fournier's data reveals that big business executives enjoyed privileged access to senior civil servants and cabinet ministers during the Bourassa administration. In short, political parties were virtually bypassed as the big business community did

not (and does not) consider them effective and influential vehicles for advancing or protecting its interests. One of the major advantages of direct personal contacts with deputy ministers and cabinet ministers or the premier is, of course, secrecy. The serious implications for parliamentary democracy and responsible government are self-evident, but as long as the general public remains unaware and unconcerned the direct and highly confidential personal contacts between business and government will guarantee the hegemony of the influence and power of the corporate sector over the political decision-making process. The relative autonomy of the state will be eroded to the point of total ineffectiveness. Finally, it has become almost a truism to state that the electronic and print media have become an industry dominated by big businessmen. Quebec's communications industry is a highly concentrated and profitable segment of the provincial economy and like other institutions plays an active role in "legitimizing" the existing power structure.

How effectively has Quebec's business establishment used its hegemony over the province's institutional structures? Moderately effectively as perceived by the business community itself and highly effectively according to Fournier's overall assessment, at least for the period prior to 1976. Fournier reveals that the business community had considerable influence on the Gendron Commission and its language recommendations, and advised the Bourassa government on the formulation of its language legislation introduced and passed as Bill 22. Unfortunately, Fournier fails to push his analysis far enough. While Bill 22 was generally acceptable to the business community, it proved unacceptable to all immigrant groups as well as to the majority Francophone population. This was a classic example of the business community and the government becoming victimized by a long-established pattern. They simply forgot that there were other interest groups, larger and more vocal,

who were more directly affected by the language issue and were not about to be subjected to an *entente cordiale* between business and government. Similarly, on the issue of separatism, the Bourassa government's continual emphasizing of the "economic disaster" thesis advanced so vociferously by the Quebec business community eventually backfired in the 1976 election. The strategy made the Bourassa government appear to be the mouthpiece of one segment of society, the corporate sector, which in the minds of a majority of Francophone Quebecers was almost exclusively English-Canadian and American. While these cavils do not weaken Fournier's thesis of business hegemony, they do illustrate that there is a point of diminishing returns. The *Parti Québécois* is no doubt much more aware of this dynamic than previous Quebec governments and consequently its bargaining position vis-à-vis business has been enhanced. Whether or not the PQ government will capitalize on the new dynamic depends on a number of factors, the most important being the state of the economy and the commitment of caucus and cabinet to break with the entrenched pattern of business/government relations.

Fournier's chapter on social and labour issues is less than successful because it does not prove categorically that the corporate sector was able to prevent the implementation in the period 1960-74 of labour and social legislation which it considered inimical to its interests. Much of the Bourassa government's problem with organized labour came from public and para-public sector unions and the government had its own internal reasons for opposing the common front strategy of the CSN, the CEQ, and the FTQ.

Where Quebec's corporate sector, argues Fournier, had the most direct and, to it, satisfactory influence was in the area of government economic policy. Since 1960, the intervention of successive Quebec governments in the provincial economy through state economic institu-

tions such as Hydro-Québec, Quebec Deposit and Investment Fund, and the General Investment Corporation has been generally interpreted as an indication of the majority Francophone political élite's desire to create an economic power base independent from the Anglophone-dominated private sector. An activist and interventionist state would end the economic inferiority of the Québécois and make them "masters in their own house." A reasonably thorough assessment of the Quebec government's services to industry, its refusal to adopt an entrepreneurial role in crucial resource sectors, namely mining and pulp and paper, its business-oriented budgets, and the plethora of state economic institutions beings Fournier to the following conclusion: "Despite increased government spending and intervention in economic affairs, the Quebec government had played primarily a service role towards business and had not significantly increased its own power. Put another way, the increasing economic activities of the Quebec state in the last decade did not provide a serious challenge to the economic power of private enterprise." (165-166)

Finally, in this revised edition Fournier offers a few comments on the *Parti Québécois* and the power of business. For Fournier the PQ victory will not bring about a break with recent developments nor mark the beginning of a new era in state-business relations. On the contrary, the sovereignty-association scheme is merely the logical culmination of the economic and political ambitions of the Francophone state and petty bourgeoisie. A politically independent Quebec state, contends Fournier, under the direction of a PQ government, would benefit the new and old French-Canadian middle classes at the expense of the English-Canadian middle and upper classes as well as the vast majority of Quebec's working people. Industrial monopoly capitalism and the concomitant influence and power of the corporate sector would flourish and prosper.

No doubt, many readers will feel that

Fournier's Marxism has brought him to elaborate a far too categorical assessment of the power and influence of the Quebec establishment. The deck, it appears from all the evidence provided, is clearly stacked and the prospect of providing an effective counterforce to the ongoing hegemony of the corporate sector is non-existent under our existing socio-economic structures. The future, it appears, is bleak indeed. There is, nevertheless, a second school of thought for those who are committed to a reform strategy of gradualism. This approach is used by John Richards and Larry Pratt in their recent study *Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West* (Toronto 1978). This detailed analysis of the politics of resource development — oil and natural gas in Alberta and potash in Saskatchewan — brings Pratt and Richards to conclude that there has been a genuine "movement away from dependent regional capitalism . . . the break with rentier traditions has occurred when provincial governments have determined to exploit the region's comparative advantage in mineral staples, and have mobilized the required domestic entrepreneurial skills to capture the potential benefits from oil, gas and potash development." (328) In short, provincial governments can extract for their citizens a greater proportion of the economic rent in the staples industries if they are ideologically oriented to exercise entrepreneurial initiative and if they maintain the support of relevant indigenous classes and interest groups. An analysis of resource and industrial development from this non-Marxist perspective would, no doubt, have led Fournier to significantly different conclusions. If the PQ can simply claim that its options and autonomy are severely circumscribed by the "system," then the old or restructured Quebec establishment will maintain its hegemony.

Roch Denis' *Luttes de classes et question nationale au Québec 1948-1968* is a highly pretentious title for what is essentially a descriptive analysis of why a

genuine workers' party has failed to emerge in Quebec. The *Parti Québécois*, in Denis' view, is the direct consequence of the inability of organized labour, social democrats, and socialists to support the creation of a labour party committed to the simultaneous achievement of two fundamental objectives — national independence and the independence of the working class. The author follows a Whiggish interpretation in its most crude form. All socio-economic and political developments in the 20-year period beginning in 1948 are made to appear as if they are almost an inevitable step by step march toward the two major developments of 1968 — the creation of the *Parti Québécois* and the victory of the federal Liberal party under the leadership of Pierre Elliott Trudeau.

Denis does not begin to deal with the central theme of the study, the emergence of a labour party, until chapter six! Everything described up to that point — rambling historical preamble, a synopsis of the undemocratic state of Quebec's socio-cultural and political institutions in 1959, the economic and political inferiority of the French-Canadian nation, and the post-war origins of the grass-root revolt against the Duplessis régime — should all have been synthesized in a couple of analytical chapters. Furthermore, Jean-Louis Roy's *La March des Québécois* (Montréal 1976) offers a much more comprehensive description of the grass-roots opposition to the *ancien régime* epitomized by Duplessis and the Union Nationale.

Ever since its inception the CCF, primarily for religious and nationalist reasons, had remained a fringe movement/party in the province of Quebec. Hopes were raised when in 1952 Quebec's industrial unions created the *Fédération des Unions Industrielles du Québec* (FUIQ). Affiliated with the Canadian Congress of Labour, FUIQ's organizers and supporters were eager to undertake a degree of political action on the provincial as well as the federal level via the CCF. Quebec's two other union cen-

trals, the *Confédération des travailleurs Catholiques du Canada* (CTCC) and the *Fédération Provinciale du Travail du Québec* (FPTQ) were not, for various reasons, supportive of the CCF or any other form of direct political action via affiliation with a labour party. When FUIQ and the FPTQ amalgamated in February 1957 to form the *Fédération des Travailleurs du Québec* (FTQ) the tradition of political action of the industrial unions came to dominate the new labour central.

Along with this commitment to political action the industrial unions brought into the FTQ a deep and serious division between activists who favoured organized labour's affiliation with the CCF and militants who argued strongly for the creation of a totally new Quebec-based third party. As Denis attempts to show, in a rather disjointed and somewhat unclear way, both groups supported the Canadian Labour Congress/CCF campaign for the creation of a new labour party, namely the New Democratic Party, but for quite divergent and, some would argue, fundamentally exclusive reasons. The division was glossed over for five years as proponents of both groups somehow deluded themselves into believing that what would eventually emerge would be two parties, a provincial based national NDP organization devoted to federal matters and a social-democratic or socialist Quebec party devoted to serving the particular needs of the province of Quebec, a province unlike the others because it was the homeland of the French-Canadian nation. The strategy exploded in the face of both factions as it proved impossible to create a national labour party along bi-national lines. It was one thing for delegates at the NDP founding convention in 1961 to pass a resolution supporting the "two nations" concept but quite another to apply that concept directly to the structure of the new party. The "national question," as Denis characterizes it, would prove to be an insurmountable barrier to the establishment of the NDP at both the provincial and federal levels in

Quebec.

Given this crucial role of nationalism, a major flaw in Denis' study is the complete lack of an analysis of the origins and development of neo-nationalism in the 1950s. Neo-nationalism simply did not emerge out of nowhere in 1960. It was the creation of neither Jean Lesage's Liberal party nor of the so-called "Quiet Revolution" that party allegedly ushered in during its six-year reign. Union members in the CTCQ and the FTQ as well as militants in the provincial wing of the CCF, the Parti Social Démocratique (PSD) had rejected Trudeau's 1958 plea for "Démocratie d'abord" and the creation of a third party committed primarily to the political democratization of Quebec's institutions at all levels for two reasons. First, and this is the only point Denis stresses, Trudeau's *l'union démocratique* entailed a coalition of socio-economic classes with divergent and antagonistic interests whereas what left-wing activists felt necessary was a party based upon a coalition of classes with common interests who could achieve a consensus on necessary socio-economic and political reforms. Only such a party would ensure the survival and development of political democracy in Quebec. (200-3) The second reason, and in the end the more important of the two, was the emergent ideology of neo-nationalism, the strongest motivating factor behind PSD and union militants pushing for a highly autonomous Quebec labour party. Pierre Trudeau and his *Cité Libre* colleagues had become identified as ardent anti-nationalists thereby ensuring that nationalist-minded liberals, social-democrats, and socialists would not respond to his plea for *l'Union des forces démocratiques*.

By 1960 rapidly changing events soon bypassed all these ill-fated attempts at creating a third party. The Liberal party offered the electorate a platform which shrewdly reflected the widespread grassroots demands for greater political and social democracy as well as the neo-

nationalists' commitment to the survival and *épanouissement* of the French-Canadian nation. This development took the wind out of the sails of organized labour's commitment to creating a third party. Both the FTQ and the CSN decided to provide qualified support for the Lesage régime at a very crucial period for those attempting to establish the NDP in Quebec. Here again, Denis devotes several chapters to substantiating his rather critical revisionist interpretation of the *révolution tranquille* without demonstrating clearly how this relates to the failure of social-democrats and socialists to establish a viable third party in Quebec, either federally or provincially. Here one can profitably consult Dorval Brunelle's *La désillusion tranquille* (Montréal 1978) and Michel Pelletier and Yves Vaillancourt, *Les politiques sociales et les travailleurs: Cahiers IV: Les années 60* for a more comprehensive analysis of the "Quiet Revolution."

In fact, only two short and unsatisfactory chapters are devoted to the interesting battle between the two groups. The first group supported the creation of the NDP-Quebec committed to a new constitution recognizing two nations and their right to self-determination and creating a truly decentralized confederal system. The second group, advocates of the Parti Socialiste du Québec (PSQ), were committed to an ill-defined form of sovereignty-association. The most articulate and influential advocate of the marriage of socialism and the new separatist-inspired Québécois nationalism was Pierre Vadeboncoeur, a veteran technical and legal advisor for the CSN. Denis fails to describe adequately the leading personnel of both of these groups.

The remainder of the study is devoted to two themes. The first theme encompasses "la réaction tranquille" which set in after 1964 and contributed in no small measure to the defeat of the Lesage Liberal party in 1966, to the departure in 1967 of its nationalist minority led by René Léves-

que, as well as to a veritable explosion of strike activity in the public and para-public unions. Organized labour's highly qualified support for Quebec's Liberal party came to an abrupt end. Also, it appeared possible to the left-wing intelligentsia that a genuine labour party could be established to break the stranglehold of the traditional parties, neither of which were fulfilling adequately the democratic, social, and nationalist aspirations of the working people.

This conjuncture of circumstances brings Denis to his second theme, a descriptive analysis of the origins, development, and impact of *Parti-Pris*, both a periodical and an ideological movement devoted to the nationalist/socialist struggle in Quebec. Denis' account does not provide the personal insights offered by Malcolm Reid's *The Shouting Signpainters* (Toronto 1972), but it does provide an informative assessment of *Parti-Pris'* continual flip-flopping on the question of strategy and tactics concerning the movement's painful and frustrating search for a political vehicle. In their pursuit of an independent, secular, and socialist Quebec, Pierre Maheu, Jean-Marc Ptiotte, Paul Chamberland, André Brochu, and André Major contended in 1964-65 that the revolution had to take place in stages. Hence *Parti Pris'* rejection of the RIN or the PSQ and its appeal for a "tactical" alliance with the progressive bourgeoisie in the Quebec Liberal party for the conquest of "l'Indépendance d'abord!" (372-391) But in September 1965 *Parti-Pris* and its political action wing, the Mouvement de Libération Populaire (MLP) issued a joint Manifesto abandoning the strategy of revolution by stages and defined the working classes as the only effective motor force in any revolutionary process. The Manifesto called for the pursuit of "la révolution permanente" and the creation or support of a political party committed to both the nationalist and socialist revolutions. MLP members undertook negotiations with the PSQ resulting in an

accord being reached just prior to the latter's convention in early March 1966. The alliance was a shaky one from the start. The disastrous results for the PSQ in the 1966 provincial election (five candidates gained only 1,267 votes) led to the withdrawal of the *Parti-Pris* militants almost immediately. The PSQ's poor showing was due primarily to the fact that it was a movement of intellectuals and students because it had rejected, in a very cavalier manner, any direct affiliation with organized labour.

*Parti-Pris* political activists then went in two directions. Pierre Vallières and Charles Gagnon joined the ranks of the FLQ while Jean-Marc Ptiotte, Gaetan Tremblay, and Pierre Maheu, rediscovering the *étapiste* strategy of revolution, called upon all socialists to build a workers' party by transforming the RIN, the only party fully committed, in 1967, to the national liberation of all Québécois. Between Spring 1967 and March 1968 a group of *Parti-Pris* activists, led by Andrée Feretti, infiltrated the RIN hoping to make it more truly socialist. Much to Pierre Bourgault's displeasure, Feretti was elected vice-president, but the victory was only temporary as a major crisis developed concerning the question of coalition or fusion with René Lévesque's Mouvement Souveraineté-Association. Feretti and her followers were highly critical of the bourgeois nature of the MSA and, refusing to contemplate either option, left the RIN. Bourgault, failing to negotiate a deal with Lévesque, simply dissolved the RIN and joined, along with his followers, the ranks of the *Parti Québécois*. The formation of the PQ also created a serious crisis within the ranks of *Parti-Pris* between Gilles Bourque, Luc Racine, and Gilles Dostater who denounced the concept of sovereignty-association and the support of the PQ by socialists, and Maheu and Ptiotte who pleaded with socialists to work through the PQ to gain the support of organized labour and the masses. These tensions were simply too great and the last issue of *Parti-*

*Pris* appeared in summer 1968 with the formal end coming in October. Its demise symbolized, momentarily at least, the end of the struggle for the creation of a labour party while all attention focused on the *Parti Québécois'* battle for sovereignty-association.

Denis' motive is clearly didactic. A full understanding of the failures of the 1950s and 1960s, he claims, will allow Québécois socialists and indépendantistes to avoid past mistakes and the numerous ideological and strategic pitfalls and hence chart the course for "la révolution permanente" more carefully and successfully. There is little that has transpired in Quebec since 1968 to allow anyone to be so optimistic.

As we all know, the *Parti Québécois* emerged victorious in the 15 November 1976 provincial election and the debate over its commitment to the dual nationalist/socialist revolution became a concrete rather than merely theoretical one. The California-based Institute for the Study of Labour and Economic Crisis devoted the Fall issue of its review *Synthesis* to a number of preliminary assessments of the PQ performance in several areas. This issue was subsequently issued in book form entitled *QUEBEC and the Parti Québécois*. It provides English-language readers with the views of a number of well-informed left-wing intellectuals and academics. All, except one, are uniformly critical of the *Parti Québécois'* performance and promise, and essentially make a plea for the establishment of a genuine working-class political party. Alfred Dubuc outlines the historical origins of the emergence of the PQ in a rambling, non-documented, highly generalized overview. He argues, with little substantiation, that the PQ, while voted into power by the petty bourgeoisie and the working class, is essentially the political vehicle of the old francophone middle bourgeoisie composed of the members of small and medium-sized businesses as well as the new state bourgeoisie, "a group of indi-

viduals who participate directly in government power through the production and management of the huge state and social services which are characteristic of state monopoly capitalism." (10) Pierre Fournier's article summarizes the essence of his book and he concludes, in part, that "the PQ has systematically used the prospect of independence as a pretext not to deal with key social and economic issues." (23) Michel Pelletier tries to explain the positive achievements of the PQ, namely in the language area, and stresses the enormous pressures exerted by "international" and "Canadian" bourgeoisies against its constitutional concept of sovereignty-association.

Jean-Marc Ptiote and Pauline Vaillancourt offer some novel and revealing insights in their contribution entitled, "Toward Understanding the Enigmatic Parti Québécois." The PQ is not, in their view, a *bona fide* social democratic party because it has no organic ties or financial links to organized labour and its ideology rests entirely on the defence of the Québécois nation. They also reject the argument that the PQ will demonstrate its commitment to social democracy and the workers once Quebec is independent and power solidified because the PQ has compromised on the issue of independence by proposing economic association. Furthermore, the strategy of independence first, socialism later is used by the PQ to justify reformist legislation while at the same time curtailing the demands of social democrats and socialists within the party. Ptiote and Vaillancourt make a convincing case for viewing the PQ as a neo-populist party which rode to office on an ideology of populist nationalism. Consequently, the PQ has pursued measures which serve the interests of the francophone petty and middle bourgeoisies, old and new, while at the same time co-opting the labour movement with mildly reformist legislation and satisfying the nationalists with the highly popular Charter of the French language, Bill 101. Nevertheless, both authors want the



PQ to win the referendum so that Canada is given the opportunity to reject sovereignty-association. Only then will Québécois come to understand that the "struggle for political sovereignty, for independence and for socialism, is indivisible, and must be undertaken simultaneously." (51) The remaining articles by Jacques Dofny on "Socialism in Quebec," Francine Fournier on "Quebec Women and the Parti Québécois," and a document by the Centre de Formation Populaire on "The National Question and the Workers' Struggle" are interesting but break no new ground. Readers wishing to follow the

debate further can consult articles by Jorge Niosi and Gilles Bourque in *Les Cahiers du Socialisme* (number 1-3) or in English in *Studies in Political Economy* (numbers 1-2). All of these assessments of the PQ are uniformly critical. This is quite natural considering that the authors are writing from a neo-Marxist perspective and are proponents of a socialist and independent Quebec dominated by the working class. Nevertheless, readers need not share their ideology or objectives to gain important and revealing insights into what Léon Dion has dubbed "Quebec's unfinished revolution."

### Bulletin du RCHTQ

Le Regroupement des chercheurs en histoire des travailleurs québécois reprend la publication de son bulletin d'information. Paraissant trois fois par année, le bulletin se veut un lieu d'information et d'échanges entre chercheurs en histoire des travailleurs québécois. Comptant en moyenne une cinquantaine de pages par numéro, on y trouve des bibliographies, inventaires de travaux et de thèses en court, projets de recherche, guides de sources d'archives, etc.

On peut s'abonner en écrivant à Johanne Burgess, Département d'histoire, Université du Québec à Montréal, C.P. 8888, Succ. "A", Montréal, Québec, H3C 3P8. Coût de l'abonnement: \$5.00 par année.